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A small gaggle of lawyers chats in the hallway at family court, waiting for 
the afternoon calendar to begin. The clock strikes 1:30 p.m., and courtroom doors 
swing open. A stream of dour, frightened, and angry litigants trudge in. As the 
lawyers bid each other adieu, one quips, “Time to listen to more testilying.” 
Colleagues chuckle as they disperse. 
Was the lawyer’s remark nothing more than the grousing of a cynic, or is 
testilying1 common in family court? Is it more common in family court than 
elsewhere? There is no way to know. Ask a prosecutor or defense attorney 
whether witnesses lie in criminal court, and you are likely to be met with a wry 
smile, and the reply, “Obviously, you don’t spend much time in criminal court. 
Of course witnesses lie. It’s my job to catch them in the lie.” I suspect similar 
sentiments would flow from attorneys in other spheres of practice. 
Don’t get me wrong. I’m not suggesting that most, or even many, parties and 
witnesses lie in family court. But it is naïve to think deliberate lying is rare. Some 
family law litigants are mentally ill, or nearly so, and lying is part and parcel of 
 
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. 
1. See Larry Cunningham, Taking on Testilying, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 26, 26 (1999) (describing the 
origins of the term “testilying” in the criminal justice context). 
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their tenuous grip on reality. The stakes in family court are so high, especially in 
child custody cases, that parents sometimes justify lying “for the good of the 
kids.” If you want to see people who hate each other, spend time in family 
court—the hostility is so thick you can cut it with a knife. Unbridled animosity 
breeds lying. 
Is deliberate lying the only explanation for testimony falling short of truth? 
Hardly. It is amazing to sit in family court and listen to two people who 
experienced the same event give diametrically opposite versions of reality. It 
happens all the time, and it must drive judges crazy. Are both parties lying? Is 
one party lying and the other telling the truth? Is it possible both parties are 
telling the truth—their version of the truth? I’m convinced the latter scenario 
occurs often. Indeed, it is probably more common than intentional testilying. 
Both parties tell the truth, but the vagaries of human memory, coupled with the 
emotions and motives rife in family court, distort memory. This is hardly news. If 
there are five witnesses to a car accident, there are likely to be five versions of 
what happened. Sometimes, witnesses to the same event have remarkably 
different memories of what transpired. Yet, everyone is telling some version of 
the truth. 
I. SKEPTICISM ON STEROIDS 
In family court, skepticism about credibility—concern about testilying—
reaches its zenith when one parent accuses the other of child abuse, particularly 
child sexual abuse. “Skepticism on steroids” is not too strong. 
Everyone agrees that sexual abuse is serious and that victims must be 
protected. So, why does an accusation of sexual abuse in family court so often 
meet with disbelief? There are several reasons. 
II. ”FALSE” ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT 
False allegations of sexual abuse occur, and a small body of empirical 
research suggests that false allegations are more common in family court than 
elsewhere.2 But what is a “false” allegation? Is it a deliberate lie? Is it a report of 
abuse that is made in good faith, that turns out to be wrong? Frances Sink 
observed, “The broadly defined category of ‘false allegations’ includes almost 
 
2. See Nico Trocmé & Nicholas Bala, False Allegations of Abuse and Neglect When Parents Separate, 
29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1333 (2005) (providing results of a nationwide study in Canada of intentionally 
fabricated accusations of child abuse in 7,600 child welfare cases. “There is a widespread misperception that 
there is a high incidence of intentionally false allegations of child abuse made by mothers in the context of 
parental separation and divorce in order to gain a tactical advantage or to seek revenge from their estranged 
partners.” Id. at 1334. “The rate of intentionally false allegations is relatively low, though it is somewhat higher 
in cases of parental separation than in other contexts.” Id.). Despite the importance of the subject, there is little 
empirical research on fabricated allegations. The paucity of research stems in part from the difficulty of 
studying the subject. How does one design research to evaluate deliberate lies about sexual abuse? 
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any situation in which an abuse report cannot be substantiated. The term fails to 
differentiate situations of intentional falsification from situations of 
misunderstanding or situations where inadequate information is available to 
determine the true or false nature of a report.”3 
The term “false” is ambiguous, leads to confusion, and should be avoided. A 
more accurate term is “fabricated.” A fabricated allegation is a lie; a deliberate 
misstatement. Fabricated reports are distinguishable from Sink’s “situations of 
misunderstanding or situations where inadequate information is available . . . .”4 
It is reasonable to blame someone who fabricates a report of abuse, and to 
question the fabricator’s fitness as a parent. By contrast, it is unreasonable to 
blame or doubt the parenting of someone who makes a good faith report that 
cannot be proven or is mistaken. 
California’s child abuse reporting law contributes to the confusion caused by 
the word “false.” The reporting law, Penal Code § 11165.12(a), defines an 
“unfounded” report of abuse as “a report that is determined by the 
investigator . . . to be false . . . .”5 Section 11165.12(b) of the reporting law 
defines a “substantiated” report as one where a preponderance of the evidence 
suggests abuse happened, and the report is not “false.” Section 11165.12(c) of the 
reporting law defines an “inconclusive” report as a report that is not “false,” but 
that is not supported by sufficient evidence. This statutory language contributes 
to misunderstanding of the distinction between fabricated reports and reports that 
are made in good faith, but that cannot be proven. 
The reporting law should be clarified by eliminating the word “false.” 
Replace “false” with “fabricated,” and define “fabricated” as an intentionally 
untrue allegation where the person knows the allegation is untrue. The terms 
“substantiated” and “inconclusive” can be retained, but should not be defined by 
reference to the word “false.” 
The reporting law should make clear that a report that is unsubstantiated or 
inconclusive is not fabricated. Use of the word “false” to describe 
unsubstantiated and inconclusive reports causes confusion. 
Concern about words like “false” is no matter of trivial semantics. Real 
injustice flows from failing to distinguish lies from honest mistakes, and from 
labeling both “false.” In too many cases, parents who honestly suspect sexual 
abuse, but cannot prove it, are labeled “false accusers.” Once a parent is branded 
a “false accuser,” his or her credibility is shot. In case after case, parents who are 
simply trying to protect their kids end up losing custody because they allege 
sexual abuse, cannot prove it, and are branded a “false accuser.” 
 
3. Frances Sink, Studies of True and False Allegations: A Critical Review, in SEXUAL ABUSE 
ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 37, 38 (E. Bruce Nicholson & Josephine Bulkley eds., 
1988). 
4. Id. at 38. 
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12(a) (West 2011). 
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The scarlet letter of “false accuser” is often accompanied by the conclusion 
that the villain is an “alienator,” and probably mentally ill. These added stigmas 
seem especially likely when the accuser is a woman. One of the ironies of this 
area of family law is that when a loving parent honestly alleges sexual abuse, and 
is disbelieved, she may take actions that are mislabeled as alienation, and she 
may in fact act irrationally because she is not believed, and cannot protect her 
child. 
In addition to reports that are “fabricated,” “substantiated,” or 
“inconclusive,” it is important to understand another kind of report: a report that 
is best described as a “misperception” report. A parent’s initial suspicion of 
sexual abuse arises in several ways. Often, children disclose what happened. 
Some children come right out with it. Others drop subtle hints that something is 
wrong. Some children are too confused, frightened, or young to disclose 
incidents of abuse, and a parent’s suspicion is aroused by changes in the child’s 
behavior. Regardless of how the possibility of sexual abuse arises, the parent gets 
a horrible sinking feeling: “Oh dear God. Could this be true? What should I do?” 
It is perfectly normal for a parent to react emotionally to the thought that her 
child might be sexually abused. Some parents were victims themselves, and the 
idea that her own child is also a victim is devastating. The mind is flooded with 
thoughts and emotions, including hope that it is not true, fear that it is, outrage, 
doubt about what to do and who to talk to, and desperation to protect the child. 
The emotions stirred up by possible sexual abuse have effects that are 
positive and negative. On the positive side, fear starts the parent on the road to 
protection. On the negative side, the natural emotional reaction of a loving parent 
can cloud judgment and cause parents to jump too quickly to conclusions and 
accusations. The danger of jumping to premature conclusions is particularly 
pronounced when parents are embroiled in divorce or custody litigation. 
Consider the case of Brenda and Fred, who divorced a year ago, after Fred 
had an affair. The divorce was bitter, with Brenda and Fred fighting over the 
house, spousal support, and especially, custody of their three-year-old daughter, 
Heather. After a nasty custody trial, Brenda got custody and Fred got weekend 
parenting time. One Sunday, Fred returned Heather from a visit. The little girl 
seemed unusually quiet. Brenda gave Heather a bath and noticed Heather’s 
genitals were red and irritated. Brenda asked, “How come you’re red down there, 
honey?” Heather replied, “Owie cause daddy hurted me.” Brenda asked, “What 
did daddy do?” Heather said, “Finger owie.” Alarms sounded in Brenda’s mind. 
Heather seemed to be saying that her father hurt her genitals with his finger. 
Could this be sexual abuse? Brenda got that sinking feeling. She was ready to 
think the worst of Fred, and she quickly concluded he sexually abused their 
daughter. Brenda thought, “That bastard. He’ll never do this again. I’ll take away 
his visitation.” 
The emotions that overwhelmed Brenda were a combination of anger from a 
bitter divorce and Brenda’s understandable reaction to what her daughter said. 
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Brenda jumped quickly to the conclusion that Heather was sexually abused. But 
did Brenda jump too quickly? Was Brenda’s thinking clouded by the divorce? Is 
there an innocent explanation for Heather’s redness and “owie” words? If Brenda 
rushes to family court with accusations of sexual abuse, will she be able to prove 
it? Once a parent launches the “atomic bomb” of sexual abuse, the parent has to 
prove it—something that is often difficult to do—or be branded a “false accuser.” 
It is nearly impossible to withdraw an unprovable accusation of sexual abuse 
without looking like a fool or worse. 
Would you like to know what happened at Fred’s house? Fred gave Heather 
a bubble bath. He put far too much bubble solution in the tub—the more bubbles 
the better, right?—and the solution irritated Heather’s genitals. Later, Heather 
told Fred her “privates” hurt. Fred saw the redness and said, “Daddy’s sorry you 
got an owie. We’ll make it better with salve.” Fred used his finger to apply 
soothing ointment to Heather’s irritated genitals. By the time Fred returned 
Heather to Brenda, he had forgotten the whole thing. Brenda misinterpreted what 
happened. When she saw the genital irritation and heard Heather’s words, 
Brenda’s animosity toward Fred kicked in. Sexual abuse was the only 
explanation she could see. 
Brenda’s case exemplifies a recurring scenario: A well-intentioned parent, 
trying to do the right thing, misinterprets innocent or ambiguous behavior as 
evidence of sexual abuse. The consequences can be disastrous for the accusing 
parent if she goes to court with accusations she cannot prove. The accused parent 
will be madder than a hornet, and will accuse the accuser of lying, destroying the 
parent-child relationship, alienating the child, etc. Brenda can try to explain 
herself, but I don’t give her much chance of success.  
III. LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 
ENSHRINES SKEPTICISM IN THE FAMILY CODE 
Fabricated allegations of sexual abuse are atrocious, and merit a punitive 
response. In an effort to fix the problem, the California Legislature made it 
worse. The Legislature added sections to the Family Code that do little to 
distinguish fabricated from truthful accusations, but that go far toward 
institutionalizing skepticism of any accusation.  
Family Code § 3022.5 provides: “A motion by a parent for reconsideration of 
an existing child custody order shall be granted if the motion is based on the fact 
that the other parent was convicted of a crime in connection with falsely accusing 
the moving parent of child abuse.” This section almost never applies, but the 
message is clear: “We will not tolerate ‘false’ accusations of abuse. False 
allegations occur so often that we need a statute to penalize them.” 
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In custody litigation, Family Code § 3011 enumerates factors that are 
relevant to determining the best interests of the child. Section 3011(b)(3) 
provides: 
As a prerequisite to considering allegations of abuse, the court may 
require substantial independent corroboration, including, but not limited 
to, written reports by law enforcement agencies, child protective services 
or other social welfare agencies, courts, medical facilities, or other public 
agencies or private nonprofit organizations providing services to victims 
of sexual assault or domestic violence. 
This language is intended to reduce fabricated allegations of child abuse, but 
it casts a pall over all allegations, including many that are honest. The message of 
section 3011(b)(3) is clear: “Do not trust parents who allege child abuse. Treat 
such allegations with suspicion. Put very little stock in the testimony of an 
accuser. She—it is usually a she—is probably lying. Believe an accuser only if 
there is ‘substantial independent corroboration’ from outsiders we trust. 
Moreover, corroboration is not enough; the corroboration must be ‘substantial.’”6 
This corroboration requirement harkens back to the days when the testimony of 
women in rape and sexual assault cases was considered so dubious that a 
conviction could not be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.7 
Section 3011(b)(3) undermines truth finding because it suggests that any 
accusation that lacks substantial corroboration from outside authorities is 
unworthy of belief. Only if police, child protective services, doctors, or other 
professionals give their stamp of approval should a parent—again, almost always 
a woman—be believed. Yet, in some cases, the authorities are not involved—
there are no reports from trusted outsiders. Woe be unto the parent who shows up 
in court without a cadre of professionals to back her up. 
Family Code § 3027 speaks to the importance of protecting children from 
sexual abuse. But lest we forget the danger of fabrication, the next section, 
3027.1, authorizes the court to impose sanctions and attorney’s fees on 
fabricators. Of course, the court had this power without adding section 3027.1, 
but the Legislature wanted to re-re-emphasize its concern about fabricated 
allegations. 
Family Code § 3027.5(a) provides that a parent shall not be denied custody 
or visitation solely because the parent lawfully reports child abuse or seeks 
 
6. It is interesting that the subsection immediately following the one quoted in the text deals with 
allegations of drug or alcohol abuse. See id, § 3011(d). The Legislature recommends requiring “corroboration” 
of such accusations, but unlike sexual abuse, where the corroboration should be “substantial,” the corroboration 
to prove drug abuse does not have to be “substantial.” Again, the message is clear: Do not trust parents who 
allege child abuse. 
7. See People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 298 (1986); John E.B. Myers et al., Professional Writing on 
Child Sexual Abuse from 1900 to 1975: Dominant Themes and Impact on Prosecution, 4 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 201, 205–206 (1999). 
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treatment for her child. But what the Legislature giveth to credibility with one 
hand, it taketh away with the other. Section 3027.5(b) emphasizes once again the 
Legislature’s concern about fabricated allegations, authorizing courts to limit the 
custody of false accusers. 
Finally, Family Code § 3118 discusses court-ordered custody evaluations 
when there are “serious” allegations of child sexual abuse. An allegation is 
“serious” only if it is based on statements by a child to law enforcement, child 
protective services, or a person required by law to report abuse, or if there is 
substantial independent corroboration. Once again, the message is clear: “Do not 
trust parents, almost all of whom are mothers. Believe a woman only if outside 
professionals back up her story. Absent professional back up, believe her only if 
there is substantial corroboration. If there is no corroboration or professional 
support, the accusation is not worthy of belief; it is not ‘serious.’” 
I am sure the Legislature did not set out to undermine the credibility of 
honest parents trying to protect their children. I am equally sure it was not the 
Legislature’s intent to push the skepticism meter into the danger zone. I am 
completely confident the Legislature did both. The Legislature’s legislation 
designed to combat “false” accusations had the unintended consequence of 
undermining the credibility of all parents who allege sexual abuse. 
IV. SEXUAL ABUSE IS HARD TO PROVE 
Sexual abuse is often difficult to prove. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,8 the U.S. 
Supreme Court wrote, “Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect 
and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the 
victim.”9 In a similar vein, the California Supreme Court observed in In re Cindy 
L.,10 “there are particular difficulties with proving child sexual abuse: the frequent 
lack of physical evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of child 
victims, the fact that children are often unable or unwilling to act as witnesses 
because of the intimidation of the courtroom setting and the reluctance to testify 
against their parents.”11 
Unlike physical abuse, where the child’s injuries often provide powerful 
evidence, medical evidence is lacking in most sexual abuse cases. Lawrence 
Ricci and Joyce Wientzen write, “The physical examination is often normal or 
otherwise noncontributory to the determination of sexual abuse. In a review of 
medical findings in 2384 children, only 4% had findings diagnostic of sexual 
abuse.”12 
 
8. 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
9. Id. at 60. 
10. 17 Cal. 4th 15 (1997). 
11. Id. at 28. 
12. See Lawrence R. Ricci & Joyce Wientzen, Sexual Abuse: Overview, in CHADWICK ET AL., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT: SEXUAL ABUSE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT 5 (4th ed. 2014). 
2014 / "Testilying" in Family Court 
506 
In most child sexual abuse cases, the child is the most important witness. 
Some kids are great witnesses; others not so hot. Of course, some children are too 
young to testify, and some are too shy to talk in court. Family courts, unlike 
criminal courts, seldom listen to children. 
If physical evidence is typically wanting, and some kids cannot testify, can 
the evidentiary gap be filled by mental health professionals describing 
psychological evidence of abuse? This question is controversial among experts 
on child sexual abuse, with strong opinions on both sides.13 Psychologist Gary 
Melton, for example, argues that mental health professionals cannot diagnose 
sexual abuse with sufficient reliability to justify expert testimony that a child was 
sexually abused.14 Melton writes, “There is no reason to believe that clinicians’ 
skill in determining whether a child has been abused is the product of specialized 
knowledge.”15 Melton is joined by other experts.16 On the other side of the debate, 
many mental health professionals believe it is possible, in some cases, to 
conclude that sexual abuse is the most likely explanation for a child’s 
symptoms.17 Kathleen Faller argues that this is the majority position in the United 
States.18 Faller is supported by her own cadre of experts.19 
This is not the place to declare a winner in the debate over whether mental 
health professionals can diagnose sexual abuse. Three things are relatively clear. 
First, if it is possible for mental health professionals to diagnose abuse in some 
cases, only the most knowledgeable experts would be qualified to render such 
opinions. Second, in the “real world,” professionals who lack the necessary 
expertise opine on this issue every day! Third, most parents cannot afford to hire 
a knowledgeable expert. 
Given the difficulty of proving sexual abuse, it is hardly surprising that many 
parents fail to establish the abuse they believe occurred. As soon as proof fails, 
the specter of the “false accuser” is near at hand. 
 
13. See, e.g., Steve Herman, Improving Decision Making in Forensic Child Sexual Abuse Evaluations, 29 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 87 (2005); THE EVALUATION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT AND TESTIMONY 491 (Kathryn Kuehnle & Mary Connell eds., 2009); 
JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE: CHILD MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE, RAPE, STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE §§ 6.10–6.11 (4th ed. 2011); John E.B. Myers, 
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation: Consensus and Confusion, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2010). 
14. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 516 (3d ed. 2007). 
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., THE EVALUATION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS, supra note 13, at 497. 
17. See e.g., KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING CHILD SEXUAL 
MALTREATMENT (2d ed. 2003). 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Mark D. Everson & Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Base Rates, Multiple Indicators, and 
Comprehensive Forensic Evaluations: Why Sexualized Behavior Still Counts in Assessments of Child Sexual 
Abuse Evaluations, 21 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 45 (2012). 
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V. LACK OF A SCREENING MECHANISM IN FAMILY COURT 
Accusations of sexual abuse are litigated in criminal trials, in juvenile court, 
and in family court. Often, the evidence is weakest in family court. Why? The 
answer is not hard to find. Prosecutors don’t bring criminal charges without 
strong evidence. Indeed, they aren’t supposed to. Police investigation weeds out 
weak cases. Because of the screening mechanisms in criminal law, cases that are 
charged usually rest on strong evidence. Much the same occurs in juvenile court. 
Child protective services (CPS) social workers—often working with police—
investigate reports of sexual abuse. CPS does not file in juvenile court when the 
evidence is too weak to stand up. In family court, there is no screening 
mechanism to eliminate weak cases. A parent who believes her child was abused 
often feels she has no choice but to seek relief in family court. As a result, many 
accusations of sexual abuse that are filed in family court are based on flimsy 
evidence—evidence that would never see the light of day in criminal or juvenile 
court. 
VI. OVERVALUING THE EVIDENCE 
The paucity of evidence in many family court sexual abuse cases combines 
with an error made by many parents: overvaluing evidence. It is common for 
parents to believe their evidence is much stronger than it is. 
As for the accused parent, he will mount a spirited defense, beginning with 
an indignant denial, and then charge that the accuser is lying, seeking an unfair 
advantage, and alienating the child from the innocent accused. (Note that the 
defense is the same whether the allegations of abuse are true or untrue). Often, 
the accused parent combines denial with a request for full custody. 
The accusing parent, especially if she lacks a lawyer, has no understanding of 
the burden of proof. When the dust settles, and the judge rules against the 
accuser, she is stunned. She can’t believe it. “But what about my evidence?” 
Sadly, some accusing parents conclude the judge is incompetent or corrupt. 
Usually, the court made the right decision based on the evidence. Yet, the 
accusing parent is devastated, while the accused is victorious. But that’s not the 
end of it. The vindicated parent is in an excellent position to press the case that 
custody should be awarded to him, and removed from the vindictive, falsely 
accusing, lying, alienating, crazy mother. 
VII. CHILD ABUSE REPORTING LAWS SOMETIMES WORK AGAINST PARENTS 
WHO BELIEVE THEIR CHILD WAS MOLESTED 
Earlier, we saw that terminology in the child abuse reporting law causes 
confusion. That is not the only problem unwittingly caused by the reporting law. 
When a mother comes to believe her child has been molested by the child’s 
2014 / "Testilying" in Family Court 
508 
father, what are her first steps? Common options include: calling the police, CPS, 
or the pediatrician; going to the hospital; consulting the child’s or parent’s 
therapist; and telling her lawyer (if she has a lawyer). 
If the parent turns to police or CPS, an initial investigation ensues. If the 
evidence is weak, the case goes no further. If the officer or social worker is 
knowledgeable, the concerned parent may be reassured that things are normal. If 
the evidence is strong, law enforcement and CPS may align with the accusing 
parent. 
What if the accusing parent’s first act is to visit a hospital, call the 
pediatrician, or make an appointment with a therapist? The parent may not want 
to involve the authorities, at least not yet. However, the parent does not realize 
that doctors, nurses, and therapists are mandated reporters. When a mandated 
reporter has reasonable suspicion—a low threshold—that a child has been 
abused, he must report his suspicion to law enforcement or CPS. In many cases, 
professionals inform parents of two things. First, as a mandated reporter, the 
professional is going to file a report of suspected abuse. Second, the parent 
herself should report the suspected abuse to CPS or police. Because mandated 
reporters have no discretion whether to report, many reports are made on weak 
evidence—little more than a vague suspicion that something is wrong. As for the 
parent, she reports because a professional told her to, but her report is based on 
the same thin evidence. 
The result of the reporting law is that weak cases—cases that cannot be 
proven—are reported to CPS and law enforcement. The accusing parent is stuck 
with the report, and, when she cannot prove the accusations, she is branded a 
“false accuser.” Her protestation that she was only doing what the professional 
told her to do falls on deaf ears. The report is used against her. 
VIII. MOST ATTORNEYS KNOW JUST ENOUGH ABOUT SEXUAL ABUSE TO MAKE 
MATTERS WORSE 
No offense to my colleagues at the bar, but most attorneys know precious 
little about child sexual abuse, including how to prove it in court and how to 
effectively cross-examine experts. As a prime example of where lawyers go 
astray, consider: What is the knee-jerk reaction of many attorneys when a parent 
comes to the office with suspicions of sexual abuse? File an emergency Request 
for Order to cut off the offending parent’s custody or parenting time, right? This 
is a seemingly sensible idea, but often the worst possible course of action. 
Marching to court prematurely, before conducting a thorough assessment of the 
evidence, can prove disastrous. A lawyer who charges sexual abuse and cannot 
prove it brands the client a fabricator, and it is downhill from there. 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Steps should be taken to improve the family court response to allegations of 
sexual abuse. At present, family court is so suspicious of such allegations that the 
court is dysfunctional—broken. 
All professionals working in family law—especially judges, mediators, and 
attorneys—need to reboot their credibility meters and set the needle to neutral. 
As things stand now, the needle starts at, “It’s probably a lie.” Repositioning the 
needle to, “It could be true—let’s find out,” would do wonders. 
In the 1980s, when child sexual abuse exploded into the national 
consciousness, the mantra was: “Believe the children.” In those days, it was 
politically incorrect to be skeptical. Things have come full circle. Today, 
skepticism is the norm, especially in family court. Of course, there’s nothing 
wrong with skepticism. Skepticism in moderation is a good thing. In family 
court, however, skepticism is out of control and is damaging the search for truth. 
In today’s climate, a parent who alleges sexual abuse faces a wall of 
disbelief. Breaking through the skepticism so that professionals are at least 
willing to consider allegations with an open mind is a Herculean task. The 
accusing parent has two burdens of proof. First, the burden of rebutting what has 
become a virtual presumption that accusations of sexual abuse are lies. It would 
be an exaggeration to call this presumption conclusive, but rebuttal seems to 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, if the parent can get 
professionals to take her seriously, she faces the burden of proving sexual abuse, 
which is no mean feat. 
Lawyers need training on child sexual abuse so they can offer wise counsel 
to terrified clients, understand the difficulties of proving sexual abuse, and 
appreciate the danger of going to court too quickly. 
Mental health professionals receive training on sexual abuse. I am afraid, 
however, that quite a few mental health professionals, including mediators in 
court-connected Family Court Services (FCS), have been bitten by the bug of 
extreme skepticism. Being a full time FCS mediator, and dealing every day with 
parents who are hurt, scared, and angry, is a difficult job. On the bright side, FCS 
mediators often help parents find middle ground. On the dark side, FCS 
mediators see so much half-truth and outright lying that some become jaded. FCS 
mediators are regularly exposed to allegations of child abuse. The accused parent 
always responds with, “It’s a lie. She’s alienating the children from me with 
these false charges.” Of course, sometimes it is a lie. Other times it is true. More 
often than not, the truth is elusive. It is not surprising that some FCS mediators 
get “battle fatigue;” losing their neutral stance and professional balance. These 
mediators, often unconsciously, come to believe that many allegations of sexual 
abuse are lies. Reports by FCS mediators carry enormous weight with family 
court judges. When an FCS report improperly or prematurely contains the words 
“alienation” or “false report,” the case is over for the accusing parent. 
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Judges, too, need time at the training table. The vast majority of California’s 
judges are fair, honest, and intelligent. They do their best to decide cases on the 
evidence, and to keep personal opinion out of it. Unfortunately, the air is so thick 
with skepticism about allegations of sexual abuse that judges cannot help but 
absorb some of the doubt. The message should not be: “Believe the children.” 
The message should be: “Keep an open mind. Don’t prejudge.” 
Finally, anyone who thinks there is not an element of sexism here either is 
not paying attention or has no understanding of history. The vast majority of 
parents who raise suspicions of sexual abuse are mothers. The over-the-top 
skepticism is directed at women. There is a long tradition in law and culture of 
not believing women, and of attributing women’s claims of sexual abuse to 
fantasy, vindictiveness, or mental instability. Is history repeating itself? 
 
